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NOTES
SECURITIES AS SUBJECTS OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
Despite the Blue Sky Laws in force in all the states except
Nevada,1 the losses sustained by the investing public in this
country have increased yearly to the extent that in the last decade,
according to reasonable estimates, the American people were
fleeced of twenty-five billion dollars.2 The cause for such a
wholesale evasion of state security laws lies in the fact that the
offer and sale of securities to the people of a state, by one who
never sets foot in the state, through the mediums of the mails and
interstate carriers, is the prevailing means of escaping the re-
strictions imposed by the state laws.3 As a result of this
situation, which minimized the good to be derived from state
regulation, there arose a great demand for a Federal Blue Sky
Law. As early as 1922, Congressman Denison, of Illinois, pre-
sented to Congress the first Denison bill, "to prevent the use of
the United States mails and other agencies of interstate com-
merce for transporting and for promoting the sale of securities
contrary to the laws of the states.' ' 4 However, no act was passed
in pursuance of this growing need for federal regulation until the
passage of the Securities Act of 1933 by the "New Deal"
Congress. 5
The Securities Act of 1933 is far-reaching in its attempt to
remedy the existing evil, and is not without a constitutional ques-
tion as to its validity. By compelling the registration of security
issues, intended for interstate distribution, with the Federal
Trade Commission, and extending the liability of those interested
in these issues, the Act transcends the scope of any of the pre-
viously proposed bills on the subject.6 Also, the Act states clearly
that it is not to supersede the state laws, but rather is to supple-
ment them. 7 To relieve a doubt as to what securities are affected
by the Federal Laws, all, save for a few enumerated exemptions,
are specifically included. 8 Likewise, it is clear that the constitu-
1 Thorpe and Ellis, Manual of the Federal Securities Act (1933) pages
130-131. Reed and Washburn, Blue Sky Laws (1930).
2 Seventy-Third Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Report No. 47; see 14 Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of Corporations (1933) sec. 6736.
a Note (1933) 1 University of Chicago Law Review 88.
4 Sixty-Seventh Congress, 1st Sess., H. R. No. 10,102.
5Act of May 27, 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 14 U. S. C. A. 77 (Supp. 1933).
6 Ibid.
7 Securities Act of 1933, see. 18.
s The Act provides: "The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury
stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of interest in property, tangible
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tional power relied upon as the basis for this legislation derives
from the commerce clause,9 as well as from the power to regulate
the mails.' 0 Although it seems well settled that Congress has
complete power to regulate the mails," a nice question arises as
to whether securities are subjects of interstate commerce so as to
be within the commerce clause.
The issue as to whether securities are subjects of interstate
commerce never has been decided by the United States Supreme
Court. 2 There are, however, numerous precedents upon which
such a decision may be based. A review of the past cases bearing
on the subject shows not only a marked expansion of the scope
of the commerce clause, but also a decided conflict. It is clear
that the Supreme Court, in order to pass on this issue, will be
forced to reconcile its prior decisions or to disregard some of them.
The first attempt to define the commerce clause is found in the
celebrated case of Gibbons v. Ogden'3 in which Chief Justice
Marshall said:
"Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something
more; it is intercourse. It describes the commercial inter-
course between nations, and parts of nations in all its
branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying
on that intercourse."
Thus, the word commerce as used in the commerce clause was ex-
tended to its broadest sense during the early years of our
government. This interpretation, which is considered by Mr.
Justice Stone as Chief Justice Marshall's greatest contribution
to the cause of Federal government, 4 has proven its applicability
to meeting the everchanging conditions in commerce. On the
basis of this decision, the Supreme Court often has included
or intangible, or, in general, any instrument commonly known as a security,
or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim cer-
tificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscibe to or purchase, any
of the foregoing." Sec. 2(1). The exempted securities include those issued
by the government; notes maturing in less than nine months; securities is-
sued by corporations operating for religious, educational, benevolent, fra-
ternal, charitable, or reformatory purposes without profit, or by cooperative
associations, or by common carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce
Act, or by a receiver or a trustee in bankruptcy; and insurance contracts.
Sec. 3.
0 United States Constitution, Article I, section 8. See Securities Act of
1933, sec. 2 (7).
loEx parte Jackson (1877) 96 U. S. 727.
1 Ibid.; 35 Stat. 1130 (1909) 18 U. S. C. 338; Public Clearing House v.
Coyne (1903) 194 U. S. 497.L2 Magruder and Claire, The Constitution (1933) page 69.
13 (1824) 9 Wheat. 1.
14Note (1929) 63 United States Law Review 404.
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within the sphere of intercourse, those features in business and
industry which to the ordinary observer do not appear to be sub-
jects of commerce. In the Passenger Cases,15 the court held that
the transportation of passengers was a part of commerce, since
commerce not only included the exchange of commodities, but also
"intercourse." To meet the problem presented by the rapid
growth of telegraphy and the attempts of the states to regulate
this new development, the court said in Pensacola Telegraph Co.
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 16 after declaring the transmis-
sion of telegrams to be "intercourse," that:
"The electric telegraph marks an epoch in the progress of
time. In a little more than a quarter of a century it has
changed the habits of business, and become one of the neces-
sities of commerce. It is indispensable . . . in commer-
cial transactions."
This opinion was followed soon by the decision in County of Mo-
bile v. Kimball,17 in which commerce was considered to be inter-
course and traffic, including in these terms navigation as well as
the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. On the basis
of this broad construction of commerce as presented by the
Ogden Case and the cases following it, it has been held, generally,
that radio broadcasting is interstate commerce and may be regu-
lated by the Federal government.' 8 It would seem that on the
strength of these precedents alone, which declare commerce to be
intercourse, that the sale, offer to sell, or transportation of se-
curities are such intercourse among the states as to be within
the commerce clause.
However, such a deduction is questioned by decisions of the
Supreme Court which ignore the expansion of the commerce
clause and limit its application. Most outstanding is the case of
Paul v. Virginia'9 in which the Supreme Court, forty-four years
after the Ogden Case, held that insurance policies are not sub-
jects of interstate commerce, since they were not subjects of traf-
fic. Said Mr. Justice Field :20
"Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of com-
merce. . . . These contracts are not articles of commerce
in any proper meaning of the word. They are not subjects
15 (1849) 7 How. 283.
16 (1877) 96 U. S. 1.
IT (1880) 102 U. S. 691.
1, Station WBT v. Poulnot (D. C. E. D. S. C. 1931) 46 F. (2d) 671; New
York v. Federal Radio Commission (ct. app., D. C., 1929) 36 F. (2d) 115.
19 (1868) 8 Wall. 163.
20 Ibid.
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of trade and barter offered in the market as something hav-
ing an existence independent of parties to them. They are
not commodities to be shipped or forwarded from one state
to another, and then put up for sale."
This decision is well supported by succeeding cases, 21 and it is
for this reason, perhaps, that insurance contracts are exempted
from the provisions of the Securities Act.22 It is of significance
to note that Gibbons v. Ogden is ignored in the opinion, despite
the fact that the- plaintiff urged it as authority for defining com-
merce to be intercourse and not merely traffic. The importance
of Paul v. Virginia lies in the fact that it restricts commerce to
mean traffic, without any consideration of intercourse. In view
of a decision of the Supreme Court in 1913,23 in which the Paul
Case was restricted to insurance contracts, it does not appear
likely that the court will consider it as authority for a decision on
securities.
However, the problem is complicated further by a line of de-
cisions which hold that negotiable instruments are not subjects
of interstate commerce. In 1850, Nathan v. Louisiana24 declared
that a state statute licensing dealers in bills of exchange did not
encumber interstate commerce, since bills of exchange were not
subjects thereof. Although this case may be distinguished, since
the tax in question was one on business and not on bills of ex-
change, succeeding decisions have followed the dictum in the
principal case, to the effect that negotiable bills are not commerce,
but are instrumentalities of commerce. As late as 1927, in Hemp-
hill v. Orloff,25 the Supreme Court held on authority of Nathan v.
Louisiana and Paul v. Virginia that the sale of negotiable notes is
21Approved in Hooper v. California (1894) 155 U. S. 648; Noble v.
Mitchell (1896) 164 U. S. 367; N. Y. Life Insurance Co. v. Cravens (1899)
178 U. S. 389; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg (1922) 260 U. S. 71;
Bothwell et al. v. Buckbee, Mears Co. (1927) 275 U. S. 274; Nutting v. Massa-
chusetts (1901) 183 U. S. 553.
22 Securities Act of 1933, sec. 3; exempts "Any insurance or endowment
policy or annuity contract or optional annuity contract, issued by a cor-
poration subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank com-
missioner, or any agency or officer performing like functions, of any State
or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia."
23 In N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County (1913) 231 U. S. 495, Mr.
Justice McKenna stated that "the decision of the cases is that contracts of
insurance are not commerce at all, neither state nor interstate." He then
distinguished insurance contracts saying that "the Lottery case and the Pigg
case were concerned with transactions which involved the transportation of
property and were not mere personal contracts" as insurance is.
24 (1850) 8 How. 73.
25 (1927) 277 U. S. 537. In this case the court held that negotiable instru-
ments were contracts incident to commerce and therefore not subjects of
interstate commerce.
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not interstate commerce. A recent text considers this state-
ment to be a settled legal principle. 26
There is another aspect of the problem to be considered. It is
apparent that the Securities Act of 1933 is intended to regulate
contracts of sale and offers to sell by persons in different states,
27
as well as the transportations of the securities. It is equally ap-
parent that such contracts in the past have been considered as
incident to, rather than as parts of, interstate commerce. Con-
tracts by brokers for the sale of futures are not subjects of inter-
state commerce, and may be regulated by Congress under its
police power only when such contracts encumber and burden in-
terstate commerce;28 likewise, contracts for advertising to ap-
pear in interstate commerce are not subjects of such commerce ;29
similarly, a broker engaged in negotiating sales between citizens
of different states is not engaged in interstate commerce;3o
neither is one selling livestock coming from another state.31
As a result of these decisions, the general rule has been recog-
nized that "contracts incident to commerce are subjects of state
regulation, since they are not interstate commerce." 32  These
authorities, all based on decisions of the Supreme Court, seem to
indicate that the sale and the offer for sale of securties to persons
in different states are not within the commerce clause. At any
rate, this inference would be conclusive if other expressions on
the subject tending toward a contrary view had not found their
28 Magruder & Claire, The Constitution (1933) p. 69. "Neither are the
loan of money, the sale of bonds, or transactions connected with other ne-
gotiable instruments, interstate commerce." See also, Hammer v. Dagen-
hart (1918) 247 U. S. 251; American Trading Co. v. Heacock (1932) 284
U. S. 613.
27 Securities Act of 1933, sec. 2(3) ; ibid., sec. 5.
28 In Ware & Leland v. Mobile County (1907) 209 U. S. 405, it was held
that contracts by brokers for the sale of cotton for future delivery, where
the transactions were closed by contracts completed and executed in one
state although the orders were received from another state, were not in
themselves subjects of interstate commerce. Later cases affirm this view.
See Hill v. Wallace (1922) 259 U. S. 44; Moore v. N. Y. Cotton Exchange(1926) 270 U. S. 593. This is not taken to mean that Congress may not
regulate such contracts, but that it may do so only under its police power
when "manipulation of the market for futures directly burdens and obstructs
commerce between the states," as was decided in Board of Trade v. Olsen
(1922) 262 U. S. 1.
29 Blumenstock Bros. v. Curtis Pub. Co. (1919) 252 U. S. 442.
30 Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District (1891) 145 U. S. 1, wherein
the court held that a broker engaged in negotiating sales, between residents
of Tennessee and nonresident merchants, of goods situated in another state,
was not engaged in interstate commerce.
31 Hopkins v. United States (1897) 171 U. S. 579.
32 5 R. C. L. 784.
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way into the books. It is in these newer opinions that the Se-
curities Act will find support.
In 1903, many years after Nathan v. Louisiana and Paul v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the
constitutionality of a federal statute regulating lottery tickets.
That issue was decided in what has proved to be a controlling
authority, known as the Lottery Case.83 The court upheld the
statute in question under the commerce clause, although the dis-
senting opinion argued that since insurance contracts and nego-
tiable instruments are not subjects of commerce, certainly lottery
tickets are not. This decision has not been overruled, and is of
much weight. The important feature of the Lottery Case, for
our purposes, is that it ignored Chief Justice Marshall's broad
construction and placed lottery tickets with other traffic, saying:
"We are of the opinion that lottery tickets are subjects of
traffic and therefore are subjects of commerce, and the regu-
lation of the carriage of such tickets from state to state, at
least by independent carriers, is a regulation of commerce
among the states."
If we are to consider securities as being similar to lottery tickets,
in the case of some securities a fair comparison, then the trans-
portation of such securities among the states is a subject of in-
terstate commerce.
A subsequent decision makes this analogy unnecessary, and the
case for the validity of the Securities Act is strengthened by In-
ternational Text Book Co. v. Pigg,3 4 in which the court held a
state tax on correspondence courses invalid since it was an en-
cumbrance on interstate commerce. The real importance of this
construction lies in the fact that it returns to the definition of
commerce as viewed by Chief Justice Marshall, declaring com-
merce to be "intercourse." The court affirmed:
"Intercourse or communication between persons in different
states . . . relating to matters of regular continuous busi-
ness, such as teaching by correspondence, and the making of
contracts relating to the transportation thereof, is commerce
among the states within the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution."
Thus, with a definite decision expanding the commerce clause to
include all intercourse among the states, it seems that the sale,
offer to sell, or transportation of securities among the states, be-
ing such intercourse, is interstate commerce subject to federal
regulation. Doubt as to this conclusion fades when the opinion
33 Champion v. Ames (1903) 188 U. S. 321.
34 International Textbook Co. v. Pigg (1909) 217 U. S. 91.
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of the Circuit Court of the Eighth District, speaking by Judge
Sanborn, is considered :3
* . all interstate commerce is not sale of goods. Im-
portation from one state to another is the indispensable ele-
ment, the test, of interstate commerce; and every negotia-
tion, contract, trade, and dealing between citizens of different
states which contemplates and causes such importation
whether it be of goods, persons, or information is a trans-
action of interstate commerce."
Of course this is the opinion of an inferior court, and while if the
decision of this court is not controlling, greater weight attaches
to it, since on two occasions the Supreme Court mentioned this
decision with approval; first, in the Pigg Case, and more recently
in Furst v. Brewster86 decided in 1930.
Thus far we have considered the precedents in an attempt to
determine whether the past analogies offer any indication as to
the fate of the Securities Act. This course was necessary for
the reason that the Supreme Court has not, as yet, had the
occasion to determine whether the sale and transportation of
securities are within the commerce clause. However, several
federal courts have been called upon to determine that issue, and
they have held securities to be subjects of interstate commerceST
These cases have not been overruled, but, on the contrary, in
similar controversies, which came before the Supreme Court in
the Blue Sky Cases, it was held that the state laws regulating
securities were not an interference with interstate commerce. 38
It is well to note in this direction, that the court had the oppor-
tunity of declaring that securities are not subjects of interstate
commerce; but this was not done. While such failure is not con-
clusive, still there is a strong inference that the Supreme Court
3s Butler Brothers Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1907)
156 F. 1.
36 (1930) 282 U. S. 493, 499.
T In Alabama & N. 0. Transp. Co. v. Doyle (D. C. E. D. Mich., 1914) 210
F. 173, 1. c. 182, the court stated, "We cannot doubt that stocks and bonds are
now the subject of interstate commerce, and that shipments and sales of
them, between the states, are interstate commerce. We do not find that this
has been held expressly in any authoritative decision, but,, in the present de-
velopment of commerce it would be regarded as obvious." The court then
went on and distinguished Nathan v. Louisiana and Paul v. Virginia. Later,
in Bracey v. Darst (D. C. N. D., W. Va., 1914) 218 F. 482, the court said:
"We do not think it can be longer questioned that stocks, bonds, debentures,
and other securities are subject-matters of interstate commerce"; thus af-
firming the decision in the former case.
38 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. (1916) 242 U. S. 539; Caldwell v. Sioux Falls
Stock Yards Co. (1916) 242 U. S. 559; Merrick v. Halsey & Co. (1916) 242
U. S. 568. The Blue Sky cases brought only indirectly before the Supreme
Court the question of whether the purchase, sale, and carriage of such se-
curities between the states is interstate commerce.
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will affirm the decisions of the lower federal courts and declare
securties to be subjects of interstate commerce.
What will the Supreme Court decide if it is faced with the task
of determining the validity of the Securities Act of 1933? That
is a question which this writer will not assume to answer. It can
be said, nevertheless, that the court, if it so desires, would find no
difficulty in affirming the Act as being within the power of Con-
gress to regulate commerce among the states. Gibbons v. Ogden,
the Pigg Case, and the decisions of the inferior federal courts de-
fine commerce to be intercourse, so as to include the sale, offer to
sell, and transportation of securities. On the basis of the Lot-
tery Case, the transportation of securities is traffic subject to
federal control. These authorities should prevail over Paul v.
Virginia and Nathan v. Louisiana since those cases have been dis-
tinguished on other grounds.
HERMAN GORALNIK, '35.
CIVIL LIABILITIES UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933
The purchaser of a misrepresented security, who suffers a loss
thereby, would naturally hold certain groups of persons morally
responsible for his having been injured. These groups would
usually include the issuer, the underwriters, the persons or insti-
tutions assisting the underwriter in distributing the security, and
the salesman from whom the security was purchased. The
actions available to such an injured party at common law were
limited to an action at law in fraud and deceit and a proceeding in
equity to rescind the contract of purchase. The nature of these
actions necessarily restricted the number of persons against
whom the purchaser could recover. In England legislation has
extended this group, and it is with this background of experience
that Congress has enacted the Securities Act of 1933.1
In an action for fraud and deceit the burden was upon the
plaintiff2 to prove that the defendant made a material misrepre-
sentation with knowledge that it was false, or made it recklessly
without regard to its truth, and that the plaintiff relied 3 upon the
1 
"The committee is fortified in these sections (secs. 11 and 12) by similar
safeguards in the English Companies Act of 1929. What is deemed neces-
sary for sound financing in conservative England ought not to be unneces-
sary for the more feverish pace which American finance has developed."
'73d Congress, 1st Sess. House Report No. 85, p. 9.
2 2 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) par. 349.
B Eut a defendant is liable when the public is to be influenced to act by the
representation: Paddock v. Fletcher (1869) 42 Vt. 389; Terwiliger v. Gt.
Western Tel. Co. (1873) 59 Ill. 249.
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